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THE EFFECT OF ELIMINATING 
DISTINCTIONS AMONG TITLE VII 
DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
I N its last term, the Supreme Court issued Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 1 a remarkably simple and unanimous opinion stating that cir-cumstantial evidence alone could support giving a motivating-factor 
jury instruction2 in a mixed-motives disparate treatment case based on 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 Before Desert Palace, the moti-
vating-factor instruction was considered by many to be available only 
when a plaintiff had presented direct evidence to support the claim that 
an illegitimate factor was a motivating factor in a job decision.4 Though 
Desert Palace appears merely to reaffirm the pedestrian notion that direct 
and circumstantial evidence can be equally probative of intentional dis-
crimination, it will have a significant effect on disparate treatment law. 
The decision essentially eliminates any relevant distinctions between vari-
* James S. Rollins Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. The author 
wishes to thank his wife Paula and their children for their support. The author also thanks 
the University of Missouri Law School Foundation for support that made this article's com-
pletion possible. 
1. 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). 
2. A motivating-factor instruction states that if an illegitimate factor, such as the 
plaintiff's gender or race, was a motivating factor in the subject job action, the employer 
has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) ("Ex-
cept as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice."). However, if the employer can prove that its decision would have 
been the same in the absence of the consideration of the illegitimate factor, it may limit its 
liability to fees and non-monetary relief: 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m) 
[42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent 
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible moti-
vating factor, the court-(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief 
(except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demon-
strated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 
2000(e)-2(m). 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
4. See Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2151-52 (noting that a number of circuit courts had 
required that plaintiff prove that an illegitimate factor was a motivating factor through 
direct evidence). 
83 
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ous types of disparate treatment cases and will likely increase the discre-
tion afforded district courts in disposing of Title VII cases. 
When Title VII was enacted, standard civil litigation rules applied to 
disparate treatment cases. However, in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,5 
the Court developed a pretext test that forced factfinders to evaluate cir-
cumstantial evidence in a particular way. Similarly, in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins,6 the Court created a motivating-factor test to be used when 
legitimate and illegitimate factors combined to cause a job action. The 
rules from these cases created three different types of disparate treatment 
cases (standard, McDonnell Douglas pretext, and Price Waterhouse 
mixed-motives) and provided roadmaps for judges and factfinders to de-
cide them. Over the last decade, these rules and the distinctions they 
created have been jettisoned. 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks7 eliminated the effect of the pretext 
test and the distinction between standard and pretext cases. Desert Pal-
ace interpreted the motivating-factor test in a way that eliminates the dis-
tinction between mixed-motives and non-mixed-motives cases. The point 
is not that the Court has decided the cases incorrectly or with an inappro-
priate bias.8 Rather, it is that eliminating the distinctions between the 
different types of cases suggests that all disparate treatment cases should 
be treated the same. The result of these decisions will likely be a rever-
sion to an older litigation model in which trial judges are not given spe-
cific rules to use to resolve specific types of disparate treatment cases, but 
instead have substantial discretion to dispose of all types of disparate 
treatment cases as they see fit. 
This article explores the Court's recent simplification and standardiza-
tion of Title VII disparate treatment cases. Part I reviews the Court's 
pretext jurisprudence. Part II reviews the Court's mixed-motives juris-
prudence. Part III explains how the Court's pretext and mixed-motives 
jurisprudence implicitly eliminate the distinctions among pretext, mixed-
motives, and standard disparate treatment cases. Finally, Part IV ex-
plains why the likely result of this collapse will be a shift in discretion to 
trial judges. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S PRETEXT JURISPRUDENCE 
Pretext cases are circumstantial evidence cases in which the strength of 
plaintiff's evidence flows from the defendant's inability to provide an ex-
planation for the subject employment action. Until the Supreme Court 
developed its pretext test in McDonnell Douglas v. Green,9 courts could 
summarily dispose of circumstantial evidence, disparate treatment cases 
5. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
6. 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
7. 509 u.s. 502 (1993}. 
8. The decisions have not been uniformly pro-plaintiff or pro-employer. Hicks favors 
employers; Desert Palace favors employees, at least in the short run. 
9. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
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before the defendant-employer was required to present a case. However, 
the Court's pretext test both effectively required that the defendant pre-
sent a defense and guided judges in evaluating circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination. Though pretext cases historically have been considered to 
be different from standard disparate treatment cases in which a plaintiff 
presents direct evidence to support its claim of intentional discrimination, 
the Court has effectively eliminated that distinction. 10 Now, pretext cases 
and standard cases are theoretically distinct, but virtually indistinguish-
able in practice. 
A. McDoNNELL DouGLAS TEST 
The three-part McDonnell Douglas pretext test remains the corner-
stone of pretext jurisprudence. The first part of the test is the prima facie 
case. The second part is the defendant's articulation of at least one legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason (LNR) for the job action. The third part 
is the pretext stage. 
A prima facie case consists of any set of facts that allows a factfinder to 
infer that intentional discrimination occurred.11 In McDonnell Douglas, 
the prima facie case consisted entirely of circumstantial evidence that 
proved that instead of hiring plaintiff, an African American man, for a 
job for which he was clearly qualified, the employer continued to look for 
other workers possessing plaintiff's qualifications.12 After a prima facie 
case is presented, the factfinder has reason to suspect, but not hard evi-
dence to ensure, that discrimination occurred.13 Following a proven 
10. Nonetheless, the McDonnell Douglas test is primarily applied to circumstantial 
evidence cases and arguably should not be used in direct evidence cases. See Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (noting inapplicability of the McDonnell 
Douglas test in direct evidence cases). 
11. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) ("The prima facie case 
under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading require-
ment .... [T]his court has reiterated that the prima facie case relates to the employee's 
burden of presenting evidence that raises an inference of discrimination."); Tex. Dept. of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The burden of establishing a prima 
facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, 
but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation."); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 (1993) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (noting that under McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, a prima facie case raises 
an inference of discrimination); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) 
("But McDonnell Douglas did make clear that a Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden 
of showing actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain 
unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were 'based on a discrimina-
tory criterion illegal under the Act."'). 
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. ("The complainant in a Title VII trial must 
carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that 
he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) 
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the posi-
tion remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant's qualifications."). 
13. The prima facie case makes the inference of discrimination reasonable. See Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 ("The prima facie case serves an important function in the litiga-
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prima facie case, a judicially-installed presumption of discrimination 
shifts the burden of producing evidence-but not the burden of persua-
sion-that the subject job action was not caused by discrimination to the 
defendant-employer.14 If the employer fails to produce such evidence, it 
loses.15 
Because the employer loses unless it provides a defense, the presump-
tion of discrimination forces the employer to articulate an LNR, leading 
to the second part of the test. The employer need only present admissible 
evidence of an LNR to rebut the presumption of discrimination.16 If the 
employer rebuts the presumption, the case proceeds to the pretext stage. 
By the end of the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plain-
tiff has provided evidence supporting the prima facie case and an infer-
ence of discrimination, and the employer has provided evidence of an 
LNR and an inference of non-discriminationP 
In the pretext stage, the plaintiff may attempt to rebut the LNR and 
demonstrate that intentional discrimination more likely than not caused 
the job action. The plaintiff may do this directly by proving that discrimi-
nation best explains the job action or indirectly by proving that the em-
ployer's LNR is false.l 8 This is where the major controversy regarding 
the McDonnell Douglas test existed. Before the Supreme Court resolved 
the issue, some courts believed that proof of the LNR's falsity was proof 
that discrimination caused the job action and required a verdict for the 
plaintiff. Other courts believed that proof of falsity was mere evidence 
that helped the factfinder determine if discrimination caused the job ac-
tion.19 The Supreme Court made clear in St. Mary's Honor Center v. 
Hicks that proof of falsity was merely evidence of, not necessarily proof 
of, intentional discrimination.20 
tion: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's 
rejection."). 
14. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517-18 (noting that the burden of persuasion remains on the 
plaintiff); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257 (noting that the burden of persuasion does not shift to 
the employer). 
15. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. ("Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a 
presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier 
of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the 
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact re-
mains in the case."). 
16. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03 (explaining how the articulation of a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason negates the presumption of discrimination). 
17. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.10 (noting that facts underlying prima facie case 
retain factual import even after the presumption of discrimination has been rebutted). 
18. See id. at 256 (noting that plaintiff "may succeed ... either directly by persuading 
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence"). 
19. There was substantial scholarly commentary on this issue prior to the issuance of 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 {1993). See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, The 
Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 71-91 {1991). 
20. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511. 
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B. INTERPRETING THE McDoNNELL DouGLAS TEST 
The differing opinions of what proof of falsity establishes reflect differ-
ing visions of the McDonnell Douglas test's purpose. The first vision sug-
gests that the test provides both a procedural structure to encourage the 
employer to present a defense and a substantive evaluation of circum-
stantial evidence of intentional discrimination. The second vision is that 
the test merely provides a structure to force the employer to provide a 
defense so a factfinder may decide the case in the same manner it would 
decide a standard disparate treatment case. Though it is clear that the 
Court has embraced the second vision, its rejection of the first vision is 
important. 
Context suggests that viewing the McDonnell Douglas test as a 
roadmap to guide judges to a verdict is sensible.21 The test appears un-
necessary if its only goal was to force an employer to present a defense. 
The test was promulgated at a time when all Title VII trials were bench 
trials.22 A judge who was inclined to require a defense from the em-
ployer could likely encourage the defendant to provide a defense without 
the formal procedure that the McDonnell Douglas test provides. That 
judge could encourage a defense by refusing to grant a motion for a di-
rected verdict and suggesting that sufficient evidence existed to support a 
verdict for plaintiff. Thus, the first part of the McDonnell Douglas test-
which automatically led to the second part-appears to have been de-
signed for judges who would not encourage employers to present de-
fenses, presumably because they believed that the quantum of evidence 
sufficient to support a prima facie case was insufficient to support an in-
ference of discrimination or was insufficient to support a verdict for the 
plaintiff. Those judges could only be guided by a directive roadmap. 
Further, if the test's focus was to be on judges who were skeptical of 
the strength of circumstantial evidence in disparate treatment cases, the 
pretext stage would appear necessary to guide those judges to a particular 
conclusion. Requiring that proof of falsity yield judgment for the plaintiff 
is sensible because the targeted judges might decline to find for plaintiffs 
even after the plaintiffs had proven all that they reasonably could-that 
the reason provided by the employer for the job action was clearly not 
the true one. Given that proof of falsity would require that the 
factfinder-the highly skeptical judge-be convinced the employer had 
provided no credible reason for the job action it took, telling the judge 
that a verdict for the plaintiff must follow as a result would seem sensi-
21. At the very least, McDonnell Douglas structured how judges were to handle cases. 
See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798 ("In order to clarify the standards governing the 
disposition of an action challenging employment discrimination, we granted 
certiorari. ... "). 
22. The 1991 Civil Rights Act authorized jury trials for some Title VII cases. See Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 1977A(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2000)). 
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ble.23 Given that the plaintiff would appear to be in a stronger position 
after proving the falsity of the only explanation that the employer could 
provide than she was just after proving the prima facie case, requiring 
that the trial court grant a verdict to the plaintiff after proof of falsity 
seems reasonable. 
However, any support for a roadmap vision of the McDonnell Douglas 
test was eliminated in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks. The Hicks Court 
deemed the McDonnell Douglas test to be purely procedural. After 
Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas test's sole function is to force the em-
ployer to present evidence from which the factfinder can reach its own 
conclusion. According to the Hicks Court, the prima facie case is a mini-
mal amount of evidence that merely triggers the presumption of discrimi-
nation.24 The presumption forces the articulation of a LNR, but does not 
necessarily suggest that the evidence supporting the prima facie case is 
overwhelmingly strong.25 Once the LNR is articulated and the factfinder 
has competing claims to assess, the McDonnell Douglas test becomes ir-
relevant. The third part of the test is necessary to provide the plaintiff a 
chance to rebut the LNR, but all evidentiary analysis-including the im-
port of proof of falsity-is left to the factfinder. 26 
C. THE RESULT oF ELIMINATING THE EFFECT oF THE McDoNNELL 
DouGLAS TEsT 
Eliminating the roadmap vision of the McDonnell Douglas test elimi-
nates the distinction between pretext and non-pretext cases and increases 
discretion for judges. The McDonnell Douglas test is now merely a pro-
cedural test designed to encourage the defendant to present evidence and 
drops from the case once that function is served. By the time the case is 
submitted to the factfinder, there is no relevant distinction between pre-
text and non-pretext cases.27 A pretext case is merely a standard case 
supported by circumstantial evidence instead of direct evidence. 
Judges now have increased discretion because they are the deci-
sionmakers at the summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law 
stages, and have fewer substantive constraints on their ability to dispose 
of cases. Now that the McDonnell Douglas test merely has a procedural 
function and pretext and non-pretext cases are to be treated the same, 
judges may make the same sufficiency of evidence determination regard-
23. Otherwise, judges could determine that the employer was lying, but determine that 
the plaintiff would still lose. See, e.g., Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508 (noting that the trial judge 
found the employer's reasons not credible, but still found in employer's favor). 
24. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506-07. 
25. For a discussion of the relationship between the prima facie case and the presump-
tion of discrimination, see Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting It Right: Uncertainty and Error 
in the New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1996). 
26. After the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the factfinder may be a judge or a jury. See supra 
note 22. 
27. If the judge determines that sufficient evidence has been presented for a case to be 
heard by a factfinder, there is no reason for the factfinder in the pretext case to be given 
instructions that are any different than those that would be given in a standard case. 
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ing summary adjudication in pretext cases as they would in standard 
cases. For example, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, lnc.,Z8 
the Supreme Court ruled that proof of LNR's falsity usually, but not al-
ways, supports a verdict for plaintiff. This presumably allows judgment as 
a matter of law for the employer in some cases where falsity has been 
proven.29 Reeves reiterates that proof of falsity is mere evidence support-
ing intentional discrimination, not proof that such discrimination oc-
curred, and should merely be considered part of a case for summary 
adjudication purposes. 
The ability to summarily adjudicate a disparate treatment case in the 
face of proof of evidence or falsity suggests that judges may exercise sub-
stantially more discretion now than they could under a roadmap vision of 
the McDonnell Douglas test. However, it is not necessarily any more dis-
cretion than a judge would exercise in a standard disparate treatment 
case-the discretion to dismiss a case when the judge does not believe the 
plaintiff has sustained its evidentiary burden. A similar augmentation in 
judicial discretion may follow from the Court's recent decision in Desert 
Palace, though by a different route. 
II. TITLE VII'S MIXED-MOTIVES JURISPRUDENCE 
A. PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS 
The Supreme Court first addressed mixed motivation in Title VII cases 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.30 In Price Waterhouse, the employer ille-
gitimately considered the plaintiff's sex by giving credence to sex-stereo-
typed and sex-based evaluations from partners of the firm,3 1 but also 
legitimately considered the plaintiff's interpersonal skills in deciding to 
hold,32 rather than grant, the plaintiff's bid for partnership.33 The Court 
28. 530 u.s. 133 (2000). 
29. /d. at 148 ("Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence 
to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to 
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. This is not to say that such a showing 
by the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly 
there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and 
set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder 
could conclude that the action was discriminatory."). This analysis would have been nearly 
unthinkable in a world where proof of falsity arguably required a verdict for the plaintiff. 
30. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Court already had experience with 
mixed motivations in constitutional law cases. E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 
285-87 (1977). 
31. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (plurality opinion) (noting that some of the 
partners based their comments about Hopkins on her sex). 
32. See id. at 231 (plurality opinion) (noting that plaintiff "was neither offered nor 
denied admission to the partnership; instead, her candidacy was held for reconsideration 
the following year"). 
33. /d. at 234-35 (plurality opinion) (noting that problematic interpersonal skills 
"eventually doomed her bid for partnership"). However, one must wonder if the firm's 
emphasis on interpersonal skills was related to plaintiff's sex. But see id. at 236 (plurality 
opinion) ("Moreover, [the trial judge] concluded, the firm did not give decisive emphasis 
to such traits only because Hopkins was a woman; although there were male candidates 
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had to decide how to manage a disparate treatment employment discrimi-
nation case when legitimate and illegitimate factors combined to cause an 
employment action.34 Price Waterhouse produced a fractured decision 
with four opinions-a four-justice plurality opinion, individual concurring 
opinions by Justices White and O'Connor, and a dissenting opinion by the 
remaining three justices. Though written only for herself, Justice 
O'Connor's opinion was considered by many to be the operative holding 
of Price Waterhouse.35 
The four-justice plurality ruled that when an illegitimate factor was a 
motivating factor in the subject job decision, the employer must prove 
that it would have made the same decision absent the consideration of 
the illegitimate factor to avoid liability.36 The plurality was clear that the 
employer's task was to prove an affirmative defense, not to carry a shifted 
burden of persuasion.37 The distinction between a shifted burden of per-
suasion and an affirmative defense is important. A shifted burden of per-
suasion puts the risk of non-persuasion on the defendant. That is, even 
though the plaintiff arguably has not proven its case, plaintiff wins unless 
the defendant proves its defense.38 Conversely, giving the defendant an 
who lacked these skills but who were admitted to partnership, the judge found that these 
candidates possessed other, positive traits that Hopkins lacked."). 
34. The Court had to determine whether the combined consideration of legitimate and 
illegitimate factors violated Title VII's prohibition on discrimination because of an em-
ployee's sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's sex 
.... "). 
35. Indeed, many circuits followed Justice O'Connor's opinion. See Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2151-52 (2003) (noting courts that relied on Justice 
O'Connor's opinion); see also Bryan W. McKay, Note, Mixed Motives Mix-up: the Ninth 
Circuit Evades the Direct Evidence Requirement in Disparate Treatment Cases, 38 TuLSA L. 
REv. 503, 513, 516-17 (2003) (discussing the narrowest grounds theory of Supreme Court 
holdings and suggesting that Justice O'Connor's decision in Price Waterhouse is the opera-
tive one). Ironically, this made Justice O'Connor's views authoritative even on points 
where there may not have been a majority of justices in agreement. See Benjamin C. 
Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 
100 MicH. L. REv. 234, 239 (2001) ("Although only Justice O'Connor and the three dis-
senters agreed that plaintiffs must adduce direct evidence in order to establish a mixed-
motive claim, most circuits have followed the minority in requiring direct evidence as a 
threshold for mixed-motive claims."). 
36. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion) ("We think these princi-
ples require that, once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating 
part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by 
proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to 
play such a role. This balance of burdens is the direct result of Title VII's balance of 
rights."). 
37. /d. at 246 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing an affirmative defense from a shift in 
the burden of persuasion). The plurality appeared to suggest that the affirmative defense 
in this setting was similar to a bona fide occupational qualification affirmative defense that 
is triggered after an illegitimate motive is proved. See id. at 248 (plurality opinion) (citing 
sex and pregnancy discrimination cases and noting "our assumption always has been that if 
an employer allows gender to affect its decision-making process, then it must carry the 
burden of justifying its ultimate decision"). 
38. However, a shifted burden of persuasion might have been appropriate as well. See 
id. at 250 (plurality opinion) (noting that employer created the risk of being viewed as a 
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affirmative defense suggests that the plaintiff has actually proven its case, 
though the defendant would retain an opportunity to justify its actions. 
Ultimately, the Court determined that no Title VII violation has occurred 
if an employer proves its affirmative defense.39 
Justice O'Connor's approach was different, as she considered a mixed-
motives case to be a particularly strong disparate treatment case.40 Thus, 
she viewed the plurality's test as a largely justified shifting of the burden 
of persuasion, rather than as the creation of an affirmative defense.41 
However, rather than use the plurality's motivating factor test, she ar-
gued that the plaintiff needed to demonstrate through direct evidence 
that an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the job decision 
before a shift in the burden of persuasion was justified.42 Justice White 
likewise viewed the issue as one involving burden shifting rather than an 
affirmative defense.43 
The dissenters argued that the McDonnell Douglas v. Green44 pretext 
test was the appropriate test for mixed-motives cases.45 To them, causa-
tion was the issue. They suggested that Title VII required the plaintiff to 
prove that the illegitimate factor was a but-for cause of the subject job 
decision. A burden shift never occurs because the plaintiff either carries 
its burden of persuasion and wins or fails to carry its burden and loses. 
For them, anything short of but-for causation is insufficient to demon-
strate that the subject job decision was made because of sex as required 
discriminator by injecting improper motivation into the decisionmaking process and, thus, 
could not complain about the burden shift/affirmative defense). 
39. /d. at 237 (plurality opinion) ("Under [the Circuit Court's] approach, an employer 
is not deemed to have violated Title VII if it proves that it would have made the same 
decision in the absence of an impermissible motive, whereas under the District Court's 
approach, the employer's proof in that respect only avoids equitable relief. We decide 
today that the Court of Appeals had the better approach .... "). 
40. /d. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Once all the evidence has been received, 
the court should determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse frame-
work properly applies to the evidence before it. If the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the 
Price Waterhouse threshold, the case should be decided under the principles enunciated in 
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of persuasion on 
the ultimate issue whether the employment action was taken because of discrimination."). 
Justice O'Connor then focused on the strength of the evidence presented to explain when 
her test should be used. See id. at 272-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (focusing on the 
strength of plaintiff's evidence as the key to burden shift). 
41. However, it is somewhat unclear that plaintiff would always need a shift in the 
burden of persuasion. See id. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the 
factfinder who knows that employer has used an illegitimate factor in a decision "could 
conclude that absent further explanation, the employer's discriminatory motivation 
'caused' the employment decision"). 
42. /d. at 261, 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, in order to justify shifting 
the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a disparate treatment plaintiff must 
show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the 
decision."). 
43. /d. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring). 
44. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 279 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "continued 
adherence" to McDonnell Douglas and Burdine "is a wiser course" than the plurality's). 
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by Title VII.46 
Price Waterhouse's core principle, derived from the plurality and con-
curring opinions, is that an employer who uses illegitimate factors in mak-
ing an employment decision has violated Title VII, unless the employer 
can prove that it would have made the same decision regardless.47 How-
ever, two major, unresolved issues lingered after Price Waterhouse. The 
first was whether the plaintiff had to bear the heavier burden of proving 
that an illegitimate factor was a substantial factor or the lighter burden of 
proving that it was a motivating factor to trigger the burden shift/affirma-
tive defense. The second was whether proof that the illegitimate factor 
played a role in the subject decision had to be supported by direct evi-
dence or merely by circumstantial evidence.48 The issues were unsettled 
because they appeared to be issues on which the plurality and concurring 
justices differed.49 However, one issue appeared clear: mixed-motives 
cases were to be treated differently than other disparate treatment cases. 
B. THE MoTIVATING FACTOR TEsT AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 
OF 1991 
In the wake of Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, which included changes to Title VII. The Act clarified the Price 
Waterhouse plurality's motivating factor test and made it a formal part of 
Title VII.5° Consequently, an unlawful employment practice may be 
46. See id. at 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that plaintiff should lose because 
she could not prove that she would have been admitted to the partnership if only legiti-
mate factors had been considered by partnership). The focus was to be on harm, not mo-
tives. See id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our decisions confirm that Title VII is not 
concerned with the mere presence of impermissible motives; it is directed to employment 
decisions that result from those motives."). 
47. /d. at. 244-45 (plurality opinion) ("[O)nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that 
gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a 
finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had 
not allowed gender to play such a role."). 
48. This distinction is arguably theoretical, as it can be very difficult to differentiate 
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See id. at 291 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence); Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: 
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651, 662-63 (2000) (noting the 
inability of easily distinguishing direct and circumstantial evidence in the employment dis-
crimination context); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather 
Than Intent, 34 CoLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 657,667 n.40 (2003) ("The distinction between 
direct and circumstantial evidence is often a difficult one to make, and in recent years 
courts have narrowed the range of behavior that is defined as 'direct evidence.'"); see also 
Mizer, supra note 35, at 239-41 (noting the different ways in which circuit courts have 
defined direct evidence after adopting the direct evidence standard). In addition, direct 
evidence cases may contain circumstantial evidence and circumstantial evidence cases may 
also utilize direct evidence. 
49. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 259 
(White, J., concurring) (stating that the illegitimate factor had to be a substantial factor in 
the decision to affect the burden of persuasion). 
50. To be clear, Congress adopted the plaintiffs motivating factor test rather than Jus-
tice O'Connor's substantial factor test. However, the Act actually adopts the general vi-
sion of the District Court opinion in Price Waterhouse, which suggests that Title VII is 
breached as soon as illegitimate factors are considered in making a job decision regardless 
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proven merely by demonstrating that an illegitimate factor was a motivat-
ing factor in a job decision. 51 However, if the employer can prove that its 
decision would have been the same regardless of the use of the illegiti-
mate factor, the plaintiff's monetary recovery is limited to attorney's fees 
and costs.52 
Whether the motivating factor test applies to all Title VII disparate 
treatment cases or only to mixed-motives cases is unclear from its text. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not limit the motivating factor test to 
mixed-motives cases, and the test only states that an unlawful employ-
ment practice is proven when an illegitimate factor is a motivating factor 
in the subject decision.53 Conversely, the context of the passage of the 
1991 Act suggests that the motivating factor test might apply only to 
mixed-motives cases. The motivating factor test was passed to address 
Price Waterhouse, a mixed-motives case. In addition, the motivating fac-
tor test appears to complement the normal but-for causation test rather 
than supplant it.54 This suggests that the motivating factor test applies to 
mixed-motives cases and that but-for causation applies to non-mixed-mo-
tives cases. Similarly, a continued distinction between mixed-motives and 
pretext cases might be appropriate because of the starkly different ways 
in which pretext and mixed-motives cases were treated when the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 was passed. For example, at that time, the notion of 
an affirmative defense for a defendant or a shift in the burden of persua-
sion in a pretext case was anathema.55 Because there was no indication 
from Congress that the rule was to change how pretext cases were han-
dled, that might suggest Congress thought the distinction between mixed-
motives and pretext cases was sound. 
Of course, the argument that the motivating factor test applies to 
mixed-motives cases and a but-for test applies to non-mixed-motives 
cases suggests that there is a way to distinguish such cases. Though some 
Justices see virtually no difference between mixed-motives and non-
of its actual effect on the decision. /d. at 237 (plurality opinion) ('"[The trial judge] held 
that Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the basis of sex by 
consciously giving credence and effect to partners' comments that resulted from sex 
stereotyping."). 
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
52. The plaintiff may also be granted declaratory and injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2000). 
53. The Price Waterhouse plurality suggests that mere use of an illegitimate factor vio-
lates Title VII's spirit, see 490 U.S. at 240-41, but eliminated recovery if the employer could 
prove it would have made the same decision, id. at 244-45. 
54. The language of the Act suggests that the motivating factor test may be an alterna-
tive way-other than through but-for causation-to prove an unlawful employment prac-
tice. See supra note 2. Clearly, either method may be used to prove the existence of an 
unlawful employment practice. 
55. See Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1981) ("In sum-
mary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the defendant to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence the existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the respondent 
.... When the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant 
bears only the burden of explaining clearly the nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions."). 
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mixed-motives cases,56 two possible distinctions have been forwarded. 
First, some have suggested that mixed-motives cases presume multiple 
causes of a job action, whereas non-mixed-motives cases presume a single 
cause.57 Second, Justice O'Connor's direct evidence requirement for 
mixed-motives cases differentiated mixed-motives cases from pretext 
cases, though arguably not from standard direct evidence cases. Though 
Justice O'Connor did not suggest a qualitative distinction between the 
types of cases, her direct evidence requirement suggested a functional dis-
tinction that many courts embraced.58 It may seem odd that some courts 
embraced the distinction given that Justice O'Connor's opinion was 
seemingly repudiated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but they did.59 
However, Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa60 eliminates the distinction between 
mixed-motives and pretext cases that was based on the existence of direct 
evidence. 
C. DEsERT PALACE, INc. v. CosTA 
In Desert Palace, the Court ruled that a plaintiff could prove an illegiti-
mate factor was a motivating factor for a job decision through either cir-
cumstantial or direct evidence.61 In that case, the plaintiff complained of 
disparate treatment sex discrimination.62 At trial, the plaintiff presented 
evidence suggesting that she had been treated differently than her male 
colleagues at work, including being disciplined more harshly than male 
56. The dissenters in Price Waterhouse suggested that there is no fundamental distinc-
tion between mixed-motives and non-mixed-motives cases. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 279-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (indicating that the pretext test should apply to mixed-
motives cases). 
57. See, e.g., id. at 247; see also Belton, supra note 48, at 652-53 ("In a mixed-motive 
case, the evidence is sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude, as a matter of fact, that 
an employer's employment decision was motivated by both lawful and unlawful reasons. 
The mixed-motive case is often contrasted with a single-motive pretext case, which is illus-
trated in McDonnell Douglas."). 
58. The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not provide guidance on 
the direct evidence issue. 
However, it is clear that Congress did not affirmatively embrace the direct 
evidence standard. Congress's failure to address some of these crucial issues 
has resulted in a great deal of confusion and conflict in the lower courts. In 
fact, the legislative history is singularly uninstructive on the substantive stan-
dard to be applied in mixed-motive employment discrimination cases. 
Belton, supra note 48, at 661. 
59. See McKay, supra note 35, at 504 ("A product of Justice O'Connor's concurring 
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the direct evidence requirement has found its way 
into Title VII jurisprudence in almost every circuit."); Mizer, supra note 35, at 262 ("By 
now the irony should be clear: the lower federal courts gleaned a direct evidence require-
ment from a single concurring opinion in a case that Congress expressly rejected, and they 
subsequently grafted that requirement onto the very statutory provision that overturned 
the decision."). 
60. 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). 
61. See id. at 2150 ("The question before us in this case is whether a plaintiff must 
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
(1991 Act). We hold that direct evidence is not required."). 
62. Plaintiff also claimed sexual harassment. That claim was dismissed. See id. at 
2152. 
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employees.63 Based on the circumstantial evidence presented, the district 
court gave a motivating-factor jury instruction. The Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed the district court's ruling.64 
The Supreme Court's decision, affirming the Ninth Circuit, was unani-
mous and straightforward. The Court ruled that because the text of Title 
VII did not limit how a motivating factor could be proven, any competent 
evidence could be used to prove that an illegitimate factor was a motivat-
ing factor.65 Thus, a mixed-motive instruction appears to be appropriate 
whenever evidence is presented from which a factfinder can conclude 
that an illegitimate factor was a motivating factor.66 However, Desert 
Palace raises serious issues for the disparate treatment enterprise. The 
possibility of a circumstantial evidence, mixed-motives case means that 
direct evidence cannot differentiate a mixed-motives case from a non-
mixed-motives case.67 The Court must rest the distinction between 
mixed-motives cases and non-mixed-motives cases (and the argument 
that the motivating factor test can be limited to mixed-motives cases) on 
the notion that mixed-motives cases assume multiple causes for the sub-
ject job action and non-mixed-motives cases assume a single cause. The 
next section of this article suggests that this distinction cannot be sus-
tained and that Desert Palace implicitly eliminates any logical distinction 
among mixed-motives, pretext, and standard cases. 
III. THE POST-DESERT PALACE DISPARATE 
TREATMENT LANDSCAPE 
Before St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks68 and Desert Palace Inc. v. 
Costa,69 three types of disparate treatment cases existed: standard cases, 
pretext cases, and mixed-motives cases. A standard case is a direct evi-
dence, single-factor case to which standard litigation rules apply. A pre-
text case is a circumstantial evidence, single-factor case to which the 
McDonnell Douglas test still ostensibly applies. A mixed-motives case 
63. See id. ("At trial, respondent presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for 
'intense stalking' by one of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men 
for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men for the assignment of 
overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly 'stack[ed)' her disciplinary record and 'frequently 
used or tolerated' sex-based slurs against her." (alteration in original)). 
64. See id. at 2153. 
65. Clearly, circumstantial evidence is competent evidence. See id. at 2154 (noting the 
import of circumstantial evidence in employment discrimination cases); see also United 
States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) ("As in any 
lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence. The trier of 
fact should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves."). 
66. See Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2155 ("In order to obtain [a mixed-motive instruc-
tion] ... a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice."'). 
67. See McKay, supra note 35, at 504 ("The key to differentiating between pretext 
cases and mixed motives cases has been the direct evidence requirement."). 
68. 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
69. 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003). 
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was a direct evidence, multiple-factor case, but now is merely a multiple-
factor case to which the motivating-factor test applies. 
Though the descriptive distinctions exist, the practical distinctions no 
longer do.70 Because of Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas test has virtually 
no effect on a pretext case by the time the evidence closes. Because both 
standard and pretext cases require that a factfinder specifically determine 
that intentional discrimination was more likely than not the cause of the 
subject job action, pretext and standard cases are practically indistin-
guishable. Similarly, Desert Palace appears to have leveled the distinc-
tions between mixed-motives cases and pretext cases. Indeed, pretext 
and mixed-motives cases can morph into one another so easily that it 
makes little sense to treat them differently. 
A. THE SAMENESS OF PRETEXT AND MIXED-MOTIVES CASES 
The evidence presented in mixed-motives and pretext cases does not 
differentiate them, only the questions asked of the factfinders in those 
cases distinguish them.71 Because pretext cases presume a single cause of 
the job action, pretext case factfinders are asked directly to determine 
whether discrimination caused the job action. Because mixed-motives 
cases assume multiple causes of the job action, mixed-motives case 
factfinders are asked, in bifurcated fashion, to determine what role dis-
crimination played in the job action. First, they determine if an illegiti-
mate factor was a motivating factor. Then, they determine if the 
employer has proven that the illegitimate factor was not a but-for cause 
of the job action. 
Though the instructions given in the cases are different, a pretext case 
is in precisely the same posture as a circumstantial evidence, mixed-mo-
tives case by the close of evidence. In a pretext case, the parties present a 
prima facie case, the employer's LNR, evidence of the falsity of the LNR, 
and possibly evidence directly rebutting the prima facie case. In a mixed-
motives case, the parties present all evidence that may prove that inten-
tional discrimination motivated the job action and all evidence that may 
70. A number of commentators have suggested an eventual leveling of distinctions 
among different types of disparate treatment cases. See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The 
Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. 
REv. 563, 583 (1996) ("A new, uniform structure for analysis of disparate treatment cases 
has emerged. This model, which may replace the separate models established in McDon-
nell Douglas/Burdine and Price Waterhouse, began its emergence with Congress's reaction 
to Price Waterhouse through its enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991."). 
71. However, both the plurality and Justice White argued in Price Waterhouse that 
there is a real distinction between pretext and mixed-motives cases. See Price Waterhouse, 
490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion) (noting that "the premise of Burdine is that either a 
legitimate or an illegitimate set of considerations Jed to the challenged decision"); id. at 260 
(White, J., concurring) ("The Court has made clear that 'mixed-motives' cases, such as the 
present one, are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. In 
pretext cases, 'the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the 
"true" motives behind the decision.' NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n.5 
(1983). In mixed-motives cases, however, there is no one 'true' motive behind the decision. 
Instead, the decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate."). 
2004] TITLE VII DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES 97 
prove that intentional discrimination did not motivate the job action. Not 
surprisingly, with a little juggling, the evidence in a pretext case looks 
very similar to that in a circumstantial-evidence, mixed-motives case and 
vice-versa. 
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks72 is an example of how easily a pre-
text case can morph into a mixed-motives case. In Hicks, the plaintiff was 
fired ostensibly for the number and severity of his disciplinary viola-
tions.73 At trial, the plaintiff provided a prima facie case and evidence of 
the falsity of the claim that disciplinary reasons explained his termination. 
Indeed, the trial judge, sitting as factfinder, found that plaintiff had 
proven that the proffered reasons were not credible.74 Simply, the plain-
tiff in Hicks appeared to have been treated differently than similarly situ-
ated white employees.75 However, the judge determined that the plaintiff 
had only proven that his supervisor had a vendetta against him and fired 
him because he did not like plaintiff, not that the plaintiff was fired be-
cause of his race. Thus, the judge found for the employer.76 
At the close of evidence in Hicks, at least two theories could have sup-
ported the existence of mixed motives. The first theory is that the plain-
tiff was fired both because of his race and his disciplinary violations, as 
neither alone would have caused his termination.77 The second theory 
incorporates the trial judge's ultimate conclusion-the plaintiff's firing 
was attributable to a personal vendetta. If the personal vendetta was fu-
eled in part by the plaintiff's race, the case could be a mixed-motives case. 
Circumstantial evidence of the racial nature of the vendetta could have 
included how the supervisor interacted with others in the workplace and 
the supervisor's harsh disciplining of the African American plaintiff com-
pared to lighter disciplining of white employees. 
Similarly, Desert Palace could easily be a pretext case. In Desert Pal-
ace, the plaintiff could have presented evidence of her qualifications plus 
evidence that her employer had treated her differently and more harshly 
than her male co-workers_78 The differential treatment could lead a 
72. 509 u.s. 502 (1993). 
73. ld. at 507 (noting that the employer's LNRs were "the severity and the accumula-
tion of rules violations committed by" plaintiff). 
74. /d. at 508 ("The District Court, acting as trier of fact in this bench trial, found that 
the reasons petitioners gave were not the real reasons for respondent's demotion and 
discharge."). 
75. The plaintiff was the only shift commander reprimanded for his subordinates' vio-
lations. Other white shift commanders were not so reprimanded. Hicks v. St. Mary's 
Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246, 1250 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
76. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. 
77. Because the number of African American employees at St. Mary's Honor Center 
appeared to remain constant over the relevant time period, one could argue that race alone 
did not cause plaintiff's termination. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508 n.2. 
78. Interestingly, some courts require proof of differential treatment as part of a plain-
tiff's prima facie pretext case. 
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach, in order to estab-
lish a prima facie case for gender discrimination, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing 
her job to her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) that in spite of her 
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factfinder to infer that her firing was caused by her sex. This would be 
sufficient to support a prima facie case. The employer presented evi-
dence suggesting that plaintiff's disciplinary problems justified her termi-
nation.79 This would be a sufficient articulation of a LNR. Evidence that 
she was disciplined more harshly than male employees would allow a 
factfinder to infer the LNR's falsity. At the close of evidence, both sides 
would have presented evidence sufficient to support their cases and the 
inferences that illegitimate factors did or did not cause the subject job 
action.80 
After Desert Palace, the pretext case and the circumstantial evidence, 
mixed-motives case are the same. In both cases, there is circumstantial 
evidence from which a jury could determine that discrimination was or 
was not the reason for the job action, that legitimate and illegitimate fac-
tors combined to cause the job action or that the cause of the job action 
was unclear.81 At the close of evidence, a factfinder would not distin-
guish a mixed-motives case from a pretext case. In both pretext and 
mixed-motives cases, each party will argue that their claimed motivation 
was the only motivation for the job action.82 In a mixed-motives case, the 
factfinder may conclude that mixed motives existed only after the plain-
tiff presents evidence that discrimination alone and the employer 
presents evidence that nondiscriminatory reasons alone explain the re-
sult. Were it otherwise, a mixed-motives case would exist only when a 
plaintiff conceded that the employer's case had some merit-that the em-
meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer, she suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (4) that she was treated less favorably than similarly 
situated male employees. 
Markel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 276 F.3d 906, 911 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Hilt-
Dyson v. City of Chi., 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring differential treatment of 
similarly situated employee as part of prima facie case for retaliation); Patterson v. Avery 
Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that proving that similarly 
situated individuals were treated differently than plaintiff can be a part of plaintiff's prima 
facie case). 
79. See Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2152 (2003) ("Respondent exper-
ienced a number of problems with management and her co-workers that led to an escalat-
ing series of disciplinary sanctions, including informal rebukes, a denial of privileges, and 
suspension. Petitioner finally terminated respondent after she was involved in a physical 
altercation in a warehouse elevator with fellow Teamsters member Herbert Gerber."). 
80. In the absence of the possibility of both inferences, judgment as a matter of law 
would be appropriate. 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is 
no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that 
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and 
may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with 
respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be main-
tained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue. 
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 52( c) (relating to judgment as a matter of 
law in bench trials). 
81. Of course, a trial judge may refuse to credit intentional discrimination or the LNR 
presented by the employer as the most likely explanation for the job action. See Hicks, 509 
U.S. at 511 (deciding that a court can reject the employer's proffered reasons, but also 
reject intentional discrimination as the reason for the job action). 
82. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a mixed-motives case, the employer insisted that 
plaintiff's interpersonal skills explained the job action. 490 U.S. 228, 236 (1989). 
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player's decision may have been based in part on a legitimate factor and 
in part on an illegitimate factor. The absence of suitable grounds on 
which to differentiate mixed-motives and pretext cases suggests that one 
cannot support providing a motivating-factor instruction in a mixed-mo-
tives case and refusing to provide one in a pretext case. However, one 
must still question what evidence will trigger a motivating-factor instruc-
tion in either case. 
B. GIVING A MoTIVING-FAcToR JuRY INSTRUCTION 
The fact that pretext and mixed-motives cases are interchangeable but 
can yield different jury instructions is troubling. Declining to give a moti-
vating-factor instruction withholds a key statement of law from the 
factfinder. A motivating-factor instruction provides the substantive law 
of Title VII, explains how the jury is supposed to structure its delibera-
tions, and provides a roadmap for its verdict. Without a motivating-factor 
instruction, a jury in a pretext case could determine that intentional dis-
crimination and the LNR were motivating factors in the job action, but 
would find for the employer if it could not decide that the plaintiff had 
proven that intentional discrimination more likely than not caused the 
job action.83 Conversely, if a jury with the same evidence and a motivat-
ing-factor instruction determined both that intentional discrimination was 
a motivating factor in the job action and that defendant had not proven 
that the LNR alone would have yielded the same result, it would award 
full recovery of damages for the plaintiff. To be clear, the point is not 
that different juries could reach different factual conclusions based on the 
same evidence. Rather, it is that different juries could reach the same 
factual conclusions, but reach different verdicts because of the jury in-
structions given to them. 
When a mixed-motives case was presumed to require direct evidence of 
intentional discrimination, few plaintiffs could be expected to produce 
sufficient evidence to support a mixed-motives instruction.84 However, 
now that the direct evidence requirement no longer exists,85 proving pre-
text appears to be more difficult than proving mixed motives. The Su-
preme Court's pretext jurisprudence requires that a plaintiff prove but-
83. The Price Waterhouse dissenters would have argued before the passage of the 1991 
Civil Rights Act that proof of a motivating factor is proof of but-for causation. See id. at 
218 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Much of the plurality's rhetoric is spent denouncing a 'but-
for' standard of causation. The theory of Title VII liability the plurality adopts, however, 
essentially incorporates the but-for standard."). 
84. Direct evidence can be difficult to find in employment discrimination cases. See 
Hopson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 427, 436 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the difficulty 
of producing direct evidence even when discrimination may seem clear); Teneyck v. Omni 
Shoreham Hotel, 254 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2003) ("Direct evidence in employment 
discrimination actions may be difficult to produce, however."). 
85. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2003) ("Because direct 
evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals 
correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-
motive instruction to the jury."). 
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for causation.86 Though the plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to 
do so, the plaintiff must convince a factfinder that intentional discrimina-
tion is a but-for cause of the subject job action. Conversely, a motivating-
factor showing does not appear to require a showing of but-for causation. 
The motivating-factor regime Congress passed in the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act contemplates intentional discrimination being a motivating factor, 
but not a but-for cause of a job action.87 Because allowing a motivating 
factor showing to be made purely through circumstantial evidence makes 
the showing easier to make than (or identical to) a pretext showing, a 
motivating factor instruction would appear to be appropriate in every 
pretext case that survives summary judgment. 
c. WHERE WE ARE AFTER DESERT PALACE 
The Supreme Court has determined that circumstantial evidence may 
serve the same functions that direct evidence does. This results in almost 
no practical distinction among standard, pretext, and mixed-motives 
cases. Though the Court has not determined whether it will retain its 
weakly plausible distinction among the cases,88 trial courts will have to 
implicitly address the issue very soon in the context of deciding whether 
sufficient evidence has been presented to trigger a motivating-factor jury 
instruction.89 The courts will face the argument that if sufficient evidence 
has been presented to support a but-for causation finding (necessary for 
reaching the jury in standard and pretext cases), the evidence is necessa-
rily sufficient to support a finding that discrimination was a motivating 
factor. If the argument is persuasive, a motivating-factor jury instruction 
would be appropriate in all standard, pretext, and mixed-motives cases.90 
The last part of this article discusses how courts and the Supreme Court 
may react to this issue. 
86. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 523-24 ("Title VII does not award damages against employ-
ers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only 
against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of 
(in the context of the present case) race."). Of course, plaintiffs may prove but-for causa-
tion through circumstantial evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 
U.S. 133, 147 (2000) ("Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is 
simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, 
and it may be quite persuasive."). 
87. See supra note 2. 
88. The Court may continue to treat mixed-motives and non-mixed-motives cases dif-
ferently. See Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2151 n.1 ("This case does not require us to decide 
when, if ever, § 107 [the motivating-factor test] applies outside of the mixed-motive 
context."). 
89. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003). 
90. The argument has some support in the academic community. See, e.g., Zimmer, 
supra note 70, at 625 (arguing for application of motivating factor test for all disparate 
treatment cases, whether supported by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence). 
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IV. STANDARDIZING THE TREATMENT OF DISPARATE 
TREATMENT CASES 
The effective result of Desert Palace and Hicks has been to eliminate 
the important distinctions among standard, pretext, and mixed-motives 
disparate treatment cases. Though courts may maintain a distinction 
(based on the putative number of causes of the subject job.action) be-
tween mixed-motives and non-mixed-motives cases until the Supreme 
Court or Congress resolves the issue, this appears to be a short-term solu-
tion given the weakness of the distinction. In the long term, the most 
likely solution will be to treat the three types of cases the same and apply 
the motivating-factor test to all of them. However, applying the motivat-
ing-factor test to all disparate treatment cases may yield varying results, 
as judges will determine on an ad hoc basis how much evidence is neces-
sary or sufficient to sustain an inference that an illegitimate factor was a 
motivating factor, i.e., the amount of evidence will trigger a motivating-
factor jury instruction and be sufficient for a plaintiff to avoid judgment 
as a matter of law. Judges could have at least three methods to determine 
the sufficiency of evidence. 
The first possibility is that the amount of evidence sufficient to trigger a 
motivating-factor instruction would be substantially less than that cur-
rently required to reach a jury in a pretext case. In a pretext case, a plain-
tiff must have presented sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that 
discrimination was a but-for cause. Because an illegitimate factor can be 
a motivating factor without being a but-for cause, the amount of evidence 
necessary to infer that a factor was a motivating factor could be less than 
that necessary to infer that the factor was a but-for cause. The precise 
amount of evidence necessary to trigger a motivating factor instruction 
would be uncertain and subject to judicial discretion, but the quantum of 
evidence would be relatively small. 
The second possibility is that the amount of evidence required to trig-
ger a motivating factor instruction would be the same as that necessary to 
reach a jury in a pretext case. As suggested above, the evidence neces-
sary to trigger a motivating factor instruction arguably should not be any 
greater than that necessary to avoid judgment as a matter of law in a 
pretext case. However, the difficulty in determining the distinction be-
tween the amount of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to infer that an 
illegitimate factor was a motivating factor and sufficient to allow a jury to 
infer that the illegitimate factor was a but-for cause may lead a judge to 
determine that the only practical solution is to choose the amount of evi-
dence necessary for a jury to infer but-for causation as the trigger for a 
motivating-factor instruction. Though there is still some uncertainty re-
garding how much evidence is necessary to support a verdict in plaintiff's 
favor in a pretext case, proof equivalent to a prima facie case coupled 
with evidence or proof of the falsity of the employer's LNR should gener-
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ally be sufficient to trigger a motivating-factor instruction.91 
The third possibility is that the amount of evidence necessary to trigger 
a motivating-factor instruction would be the same as that required in any 
standard disparate treatment case. Simply, whenever a judge decided-
based on all available evidence-that a reasonable jury could not find in 
plaintiff's favor, she could summarily adjudicate the case. Whether the 
evidence presented in any particular case would be deemed sufficient to 
avoid summary adjudication would depend solely on an ad hoc determi-
nation made by the trial judge. Though the judge's decision would be 
informed by the amount of evidence generally deemed sufficient to avoid 
judgment as a matter of law in a pretext case-a prima facie case plus 
strong evidence of the falsity of the employer's LNR-it would not be 
absolutely constrained by it. 
All of the possibilities provide discretion to trial judges, though the dis-
cretion in the first two instances is limited, as a practical matter, more 
than in the third instance. However, the third resolution is the most 
likely long-term solution. First, as has been noted, the Supreme Court 
has made pretext cases look like standard cases by telling judges that the 
McDonnell Douglas structure is irrelevant by the time the case is submit-
ted to the jury and that the only question is whether the evidence sup-
ports a finding that discrimination more likely than not caused the job 
action. It is not difficult to make mixed-motives cases look like standard 
cases and apply the same rules. Second, the thrust of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 92 was to 
allow trial courts to adjudicate disparate treatment cases summarily 
whenever they determined that insufficient evidence had been presented 
to support a verdict.93 Third, having simplified the disparate treatment 
landscape somewhat in Hicks and Desert Palace, the Court is unlikely to 
develop a specific test to tell trial judges when sufficient evidence has 
been presented to trigger a motivating factor instruction. Rather, it will 
likely leave the evidentiary analysis (and the discretion that accompanies 
it) to trial judges. 
CONCLUSION 
Primarily as a result of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks and Desert 
Palace v. Costa, standard, pretext, and mixed-motives cases are nearly in-
terchangeable. Over time, the formal distinctions among them will likely 
fall with the result that the motivating-factor test will apply to all dispa-
rate treatment cases. However, judges will likely exercise broad discre-
tion in determining whether evidence presented can support an inference 
91. See supra note 29. 
92. 530 u.s. 133 (2000). 
93. Though the Court reversed the district court's summary adjudication, it did so in 
the context of a case in which the plaintiff had presented strong circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination. As importantly, it suggested that in some cases, proof of a prima facie case 
coupled with credible evidence of the falsity of the employer's LNR still might not be 
sufficient evidence for a plaintiff to avoid summary adjudication. See supra note 29. 
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that discrimination was a motivating factor. Without specific evidentiary 
rules to guide or constrain judges, trial judges will exercise substantial 
judicial discretion to hear or summarily adjudicate disparate treatment 
cases. They will likely do so without additional guidance from the Su-
preme Court regarding what quantum of evidence should be sufficient to 
support the necessary inference and allow plaintiff to avoid summary 
adjudication. · 
As a result of the foregoing, everything old is new again. The standard-
ization of disparate treatment cases will essentially return disparate treat-
ment jurisprudence to 1972, before McDonnell Douglas v. Green was 
decided. Courts will have general statutory language to apply-now the 
motivating factor test-but only a general vision of how much evidence is 
supposed to suffice for the plaintiff to avoid summary adjudication. The 
time will be as appropriate for the Court to provide guidance as it was in 
1972. However, unlike the Court in the early 1970s, the current Court is 
unlikely to provide any such guidance. 
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